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David Slater has always had a keen interest in taxation issues, especially in 
relation to savings.
1 Perhaps one of the most important contributions made by 
the Economic Council of Canada during his tenure as chairman was to initiate 
a detailed study of taxation entitled Road Map for Tax Reform (Economic 
Council of Canada, 1987). This document was the first Canadian major study 
outlining the impact of adopting a consumption (or expenditure) tax in Canada 
as a replacement for the income tax.
2 Like most documents recommending 
substantial changes to the tax system, it did not result in a major change. 
However, it did lay the groundwork for greater discussion of the consumption 
tax principle as a basis for taxation in Canada. 
                                                             
1David shows continued interest in this subject. In the past two years, he has sent 
me several papers on taxation of retirement savings (see two of these contributions in Slater, 
2000a,b). 
 
2More details below will be provided on the expenditure tax concept. Two 
important international studies preceding the Economic Council of Canada’s report were the 
Meade Report (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1978) and David Bradford’s report (United 
States. Department of Treasury, 1977). A study by Boadway, Bruce and Mintz (1987) and 
Davies and St-Hilaire (1987) also looked at issues related to the adoption of a consumption 
tax in Canada.  
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Two moves towards consumption taxation occurred in the early 1990s. 
The first was the replacement of the Manufacturers’ Sales Tax by the Goods 
and Services Tax (GST) on January 1, 1991 (the GST was initially proposed 
in 1987 by the Conservative government). The second was a major revision 
of the tax treatment of retirement savings in 1991 to provide more equal 
treatment of holders of pension and registered retirement savings plans, 
including an expansion of the limits for contributions made to these plans. 
Studies like that of the Economic Council of Canada made it more acceptable 
for governments to increase the contribution of consumption-based taxes as 
part of the overall system. 
Canadian policymakers have an ambivalent attitude towards taxation of 
savings. While there is strong acceptance of consumption taxation in the form 
of the GST and providing tax-assistance for retirement savings, govern-ments 
have been reluctant to embrace fully the principle of consumption taxation. 
There are some important reasons for this ambivalence towards the taxation 
of savings, which I shall discuss below. Nonetheless, economic circumstances 
have changed since 1990 making it more fashionable to entertain the idea of 
introducing greater reliance on consumption taxation in Canada. As I believe 
that tax reform is very much a process for change, I shall discuss two 
economic developments that could give rise to a greater role for consumption 




The Case for and against a Consumption Tax 
 
Economic theories explaining savings behaviour can be classified according to 
three motives for savings:  
 
·   Life-cycle savings: Typically, savings in earlier years of their life provide 
resources for consumption after retirement (Summers, 1981). 
 
·   Bequest savings: Accumulated savings are passed on to heirs through 
bequests to support their consumption (Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff, 
1992). 
·   Precautionary savings: Savings are built up to provide consumption 
when resources are insufficient to cover contingencies (Deaton, 1992; 
and Skinner, 1988). An important element of precautionary savings is 
related to liquidity constraints in that a person may not be able to borrow 
funds to cover shortfalls in earnings.  
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The strongest argument made for consumption taxation is related to the 
life-cycle model, although the case for consumption taxation can still be 
made, taking into account other theories of savings behaviour (Bernheim, 
1999).  
I titled this paper “taxation of future consumption” for a deliberate 
reason. Tax research in the past several decades has recognized that a failing 
of the annual income tax, which applies to earnings and capital income 
derived from saved earnings, results in a heavier tax on future compared to 
current consumption. If two people have the same lifetime earnings, but one 
saves some earnings for future consumption, the saver pays more tax than the 
consumer does over a lifetime. Therefore, under an income tax, people pay 
more tax on future consumption derived from their savings than they do on 
current consumption. Thus, the annual income tax falls more heavily on those 
who wish to consume more in the future. 
Yet, the Carter Report (Canada, 1966), still the bible of Canadian tax 
policy at the Department of Finance and among practitioners, argues that 
annual income is the most efficient and fair base for personal taxation.
3 
However, the non-uniform taxation of consumption under the annual income 
tax is troubling. If a person’s welfare depends on consumption of goods and 
services throughout all periods of life, what rationale is there for taxation of 
annual income that results in higher taxes on future consumption relative to 
current consumption? Taxation of the return on savings does not seem 
efficient or fair under these arguments. 
                                                             
3Even the tax expenditure accounts, often cited in the press and expert analysis, rely 
on annual income as the benchmark for evaluating the value of such expenditures. See Bruce 
(1988) for a comprehensive review of the problems inherent with tax expenditures and 
alternative characterizations.  
On the other hand, a consumption tax, however, treats consumers and 
savers equally. Once a person has earnings, the same amount of tax is paid on 
a present value basis no matter whether the earnings are consumed im-
mediately or deferred until a later time. Two approaches are possible to use 
for consumption taxation. First, governments could simply tax consumption 
each year by applying the tax to goods and services sold (as in the case of a 
sales tax) or on expenditure expressed as the difference between earnings and 
savings (as in the case of registered pension [RPP] and retirement savings 
[RRSP] plans). Second, consumption taxes could be imposed by simply 
exempting the return to savings (above normal returns would be subject to a 
rent tax). This latter approach is referred to as the exempt-yield approach.  
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Without trying to review in depth a large literature, suffice it to say that 
experts have gained a much greater understanding as to how taxes on capital 
income might affect economic welfare. An important point made by Feldstein 
(1978), that even if savings remain constant, future consumption can decline 
if the return on savings is taxed. In fact, the welfare costs of taxing future 
consumption more heavily than current consumption can be quite significant, 
well approaching 20 per cent of revenue on income (ibid.) even though 
savings may not be responsive to changes in the after-tax interest rate.
4 Other 
estimates of welfare costs of taxing savings compared to a uniform con-
sumption tax vary from 11 cents to over one dollar per dollar of revenue 
(Bernheim, 1999). Although models have had different assumptions and 
characterization of preferences, the overall view provided by most economists 
is that there is a significant welfare gain that would be derived by replacing 
the income tax with a consumption tax. 
The efficiency and equity arguments for consumption taxes are further 
buttressed by administrative and compliance issues. Income taxes are not 
easy to apply (Bradford, 1984). In principle, income taxes should be levied on 
incomes, indexed for inflation. Depreciation of assets has to be measured 
appropriately. Capital gains should be taxed on an accrued, not realized basis, 
to make sure that the present value of taxes on capital gains is the same as on 
other investment income. The latter is especially difficult since accrual 
taxation requires periodic valuation of assets even though many are not 
frequently traded and taxes are assessed even if the asset is not sold (thereby 
raising issues of liquidity).  
Given these views, then why are governments not jumping at the 
opportunity of eliminating the tax on savings in favour of a consumption-
based tax? I would argue that there are at least five reasons why governments 
are so reluctant to move in this direction: 
                                                             
4Feldstein assumes that the uncompensated supply of savings is virtually zero in his 
calculations. 
·   Equity. The usual argument stated against consumption taxes is that they 
are not fair. Since savings rise proportionately with annual income, 
consumption tax critics suggest that the exemption of savings from tax 
results in a regressive tax (regressivity implies that taxes proportionately 
decline in relation to the base). Consumption-tax  advocates argue, 
however, that consumption taxes can be made progressive if desired. The 
first part of the argument notes that savings simply defer taxes on 
consumption to future years; therefore, one should calculate the present 
value of taxes paid on savings and add this value to current taxes to 
measure the total amount of taxes paid by individuals on their earnings. 
Thus, a consumption tax levied at a flat rate is at least proportional to 
earnings, once taking into account deferred taxes on savings. The second  
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part of the argument rests on the implementation of consumption taxes. If 
a refundable tax credit is provided, the consumption tax is made 
progressive in the sense that the average tax rate on consumption rises 
with consumption levels (income-testing the credit will surely make the 
consumption tax more progressive). As discussed above, an alternative 
approach is to levy a personal tax on expenditure, defined as the 
difference between earnings and savings (savings are deductible from the 
base and withdrawals are added to the base) or on an exempt-yield basis 
(savings are not deductible and withdrawals are exempt). One could 
apply a progressive rate schedule with increasing marginal tax rates that 
would accomplish desired equity objectives. 
 
·   Continued use of Keynesian models. With Keynesian macroeconomic 
models, using assumptions of fixed prices and wages, employment and 
incomes rise with greater aggregate demand in the short run. An 
important component of aggregate demand is current consumption. 
Therefore, taxation of savings is viewed as “helpful” to the economy 
since it has less impact on aggregate demand compared to a pure 
consumption tax, even though savings ultimately can affect the amount of 
investment available in the long run. Although Keynesian models are less 
fashionable among academic economists, they are still the hobby horses 
of many economic forecasting models used for fiscal policy analysis. The 
exemption of savings from tax looks inferior to equal-yield sales tax cuts 
when analyzed in these models. However, long-run models with flexible 
prices and wages would suggest a different conclusion where gains in 
welfare arise from greater growth in capital stock over time. 
·   Concerns about wealth accumulation. Since the accumulation of savings 
is equal to the stock of wealth held by people, proponents of annual 
income taxes argue that savings should be subject to tax (see, for 
example, Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 1993). Wealth provides 
opportunities for people to enjoy more untaxed consumption goods 
including leisure (the landlord’s son who does not work) and political 
power. Therefore, it is appropriate to tax savings for these two reasons.  
 
The first argument — the consumption tax is applied on a narrower base 
compared to an income tax — is an important criticism since an equal-
yield consumption tax as a replacement for the income tax would result in 
a heavier tax on labour earnings. However, the argument does not 
support the rationale for an annual income tax; it is not a foregone 
conclusion that the return on savings should be taxed at the same rate as 
labour earnings. In the end, it becomes an empirical matter for  
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assessment as to whether there should be some positive tax on the return 
to savings. Many studies on consumption taxation have incorporated 
labour supply (such as the seminal study by Auerbach, Kotlikoff and 
Skinner, 1983) and suggest that a consumption tax is superior to an 
annual income tax. The results in these studies find significant efficiency 
gains from applying a consumption tax as a one-time wealth levy on 
accumulated savings held by the elderly. In the absence of the efficiency 
gains from the wealth levy, the gains achieved from alleviating the tax on 
savings can be offset to a certain extent from the higher tax on labour 
supply. Much depends on the responsiveness of a labour supply and the 
characterization of preferences (some forms of preference functions lead 
to a result in which consumption taxes are superior).  
 
The second argument made against consumption taxation is that wealth 
accumulation provides political power. Little research has modelled 
wealth as a source of political power and therefore provided special gains 
to certain individuals. One would need to provide an explicit model of 
political decision-making to understand the role of wealth, an area that 
should be open to greater analysis with new models of political economy 
that are now fashionable. Not all forms of wealth lead to greater political 
power — housing and retirement assets, the most significant forms of 
wealth for many people, are unlikely to play an important role in polit-ical 
influence. Instead, a tax on the very wealthy might be appropriate, as 
some consumption advocates have argued. One could then consider the 
imposition of a wealth or wealth-transfer tax with a consumption tax (see 
the excellent discussion of wealth taxes in the Meade Report [Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, 1978]). 
 
·   Taxes and savings behaviour. Although consumption-tax advocates 
argue that a consumption tax improves economic welfare, many empirical 
studies have suggested that taxes on savings have little or no impact. 
Thus, many critics of consumption taxes have argued that a shift to 
consumption taxation would have little impact on savings, but a negative 
impact on labour supply as discussed above. Theoretically, a tax on 
interest could reduce savings but, as Summers (1981) points out, taxes on 
the return to savings could increase the present value of human capital 
(with a lower discounting of future incomes) and therefore raise savings. 
Past estimates suggest that the elasticity of savings with respect to 
changes in interest rates is unlikely more than 0.5. However, Beach, 
Boadway and Bruce (1988) find that the savings elasticity could be as 
high as 2 for older taxpayers (for older taxpayers, human capital effects  
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are small). Bernheim (1999) points out that studies using time series of 
savings likely underestimate the impact of taxes on savings since high 
effective tax rates were accompanied by low or negative rates of return to 
savings in the 1970s. Other recent studies have looked at the impact of 
tax-assisted retirement savings on aggregate savings (RRSPs in Canada 
and 401(k) or IRAs in the United States). Some studies have suggested 
that savings are not affected by IRA or 401(k) plans (Gale and Scholz, 
1994) while others suggest that there is little substitutability and aggregate 
savings rise (Venti and Wise, 1990; Poterba, Venti and Wise, 1995). 
Bernheim’s (1999) review of U.S. studies on the substitutability of tax-
free savings for taxable savings suggests that contradictory results can be 
reconciled by heterogeneous preferences for savings among taxpayers. 
Canadian studies on RRSP behaviour are limited. Milligan (2001) reviews 
the literature and provides some new results on the impact of carry-
forward provisions on RRSPs in Canada for taxpayers of different types 
and over time. However, in terms of the impact of taxes on savings, there 
is still much to be done in Canada that would incorporate panel data sets 
of taxpayer behaviour over time. 
 
·   Transition problems. Although there might be good arguments for the 
adoption of any major change to the tax system, any change could 
flounder in the face of transition problems. By shifting from an income to 
consumption tax, old assets and accumulated wealth of the elderly would 
be subject to new levies and there would be a desire to provide some tax 
relief for low-income individuals. Transitional relief that would make it 
more politically acceptable to adopt a new form of taxation could possibly 
reduce some of the efficiency gains from adopting a consumption tax as a 
replacement for the income tax. One very recent study (Altig et al., 
2001) has modelled transitional measures for the adoption of a flat tax on 
consumption in the United States and found that most efficiency gains 
would be lost from adopting a consumption tax that provides offsets for 
low income and elderly taxpayers. No similar study has been conducted 
in Canada, incorporating the current features of the Canadian income tax. 
 
·   Open economy considerations. Critics of consumption taxes argue that 
relief for savings will not have a favourable impact on investment in 
Canada. The argument is based on an important observation that 
businesses raise capital from international markets. To the extent that 
Canada is a small, open economy, greater domestic savings that might 
arise from tax cuts on savings would not translate into more investment in 
Canada since the international cost of financing is independent of  
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international markets. Although Canadians might own more domestic 
assets, the level of business investment would be unaffected by cuts to 
taxes on domestic savings. Consumption-tax advocates respond to these 
arguments in two ways. The obvious argument is that one should not 
evaluate tax policy solely in terms of its impact on business investment. 
Personal savings rates may be of concern to policymakers in that 
individuals need to accumulate wealth to finance future consumption 
needs, including retirement, health and education. The second is that 
savings could h ave an impact on investment since capital markets in 
Canada, while being open, are not “small”. First, most financing studies 
of equity markets suggest some international segmentation of markets — 
for example, studies have found that changes to dividend and capital 
gains tax rates have influenced stock prices, contradicting the small, open 
economy assumption (McKenzie and Thompson, 1996). Thus, cuts to 
personal taxes on income paid to shareholders can reduce the cost of 
equity finance for businesses. Second, small and medium sized 
businesses have little direct access to international markets (if they did 
they could lose certain tax benefits available only to Canadian-controlled 
private corporations). Thus, personal tax changes could substantially 
influence t he cost of finance for these businesses. Third, aggregate 
investment-savings studies have found a correlation between investment 
and savings rates across countries (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980; and 
Summers, 1986). Helliwell and McKitrick (1999) suggests that one dollar 
of new investment is financed by 60 cents of new savings in Canada.  
  
The above arguments explain much ambivalence towards the full 
adoption of expenditure taxation in Canada. Although several points may be 
raised against the adoption of an expenditure tax, consumption-tax advocates 
can easily refute most of the arguments. The economic case for consumption 
taxation is therefore pretty strong. But, in the end, political perception plays 
an important role in determining tax policy. To eliminate taxes on savings of 
very wealthy Canadians is not an easy sell. For that reason, proposals made 




New Arguments for Consumption Taxation 
 
 
The above review of arguments both in favour and against consumption 
taxation is fairly well known and generally well researched. Given that  
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Canada’s tax system is a hybrid of consumption and income taxation, it is 
clear that the debate has not been resolved in a way that pushes policymakers 
to adopt one form of tax over the other. Canada uses indirect taxes on sales. 
The “income” tax contains some important features consistent with 
consumption-tax principles — contributions to retirement savings (registered 
pensions and RRSPs) are deductible from the tax base, withdrawals from 
registered-savings-plans income within registered plans are taxed and interest 
incurred with borrowed money to invest in plans is not deductible. Savings in 
owner-occupied housing (principal residence) are treated on an exempt-yield 
basis  — there is no tax on imputed income and mortgage interest is not 
deductible. No deduction is provided for investments in housings and no tax is 
placed on the sale of the house. For many low and middle-income taxpayers 
whose primary assets are a house and pension or RRSP plan, the income tax 
is effectively an “expenditure” tax. 
Nonetheless, significant savings could be subject to tax, whether they 
include stocks, bonds, rental housing or proprietorships.
5 Are there any 
special arguments today that might give rise to a greater use of consumption 




Two New Imperatives  
 
 
Two special issues are at the forefront facing most industrialized economies, 
including Canada. The first is the impact of aging in society which will have a 
substantial impact on resources available to support the elderly. The second is 
continuing worldwide economic integration which has important implications 





                                                             
5One question that should be better analyzed is to assess the amount of taxes 
actually paid on savings. Poddar and English (1999) suggest that the effective tax rate on 
savings is close to zero, once taking into account preferences for investments, such as the 
Lifetime Capital Gains Exemption, and the deductibility of interest expense. Further work is 
needed in this area since there are difficult empirical issues to handle in estimating the effective 
tax rate on savings, including the proper incorporation of inflation in assessing returns and the 
impact of business level taxes on personal investments. 
The demographic picture for Canadian and other industrialized economies is 
well known. According to a recent study (Organisation for Economic Co-  
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operation and Development, 2001), the proportion of the population that is 65 
years of age or older will rise from 14.8 per cent in 2000 to 24.2 per cent by 
2050, with very little growth in the working age population after 2020 
onwards. Life expectancy will increase further by about 3.5 years on average 
and fertility will continue its trend downwards. Given a similar labour force 
participation rate to that found today, the impact of these projected changes 
on public resources will be significant. While expenditures on education and 
child support are projected to fall by 1.3 percentage points of gross domestic 
product (GDP) by 2050, expenditures on elderly benefits and health care shall 
rise by ten percentage points. Further, with a shift to more people retired who 
pay less tax, taxes, as a proportion of GDP, will decline by 1.2 percentage 
points. The net effect shall be a worsening of primary balances by 9.9 
percentage points which can only be made up by major expenditure cuts, 
lower debt or substantially higher taxes that will be felt by the working 
population. 
The impact of these demographic changes on public expenditures is only 
part of the story. The current working population will need to accumulate 
sufficient wealth to cover significant private expenditures when they retire in 
later years. Further, to the extent that governments target public support to 
the elderly who most need it, the elderly will need greater resources after 
retirement. Thus, savings today will be important to cover future needs. As 
the day of reckoning is not far away (beginning in two decades), governments 
will have to carefully plan now to ensure that future needs will be properly 
covered. 
As Robson ( 2001) discusses in this volume, private provision for 
retirement income and health care will be a significant part of any future 
public program. The current registered pension and retirement savings plan 
system is intended to allow individuals to accumulate wealth for these 
purposes. Given the current limitations on tax-deductible contribution limits 
($13,500 or 18 per cent of earned income), a person is able to accumulate 
sufficient wealth on a tax-free basis to cover about $80,000 of annual future 
expenditures. Although this amount may seem sufficient to cover most 
retirement and medical needs of today’s population, it is important to gain a 
greater understanding of how much future expenditure must be covered as 
the population ages.  
A c ritical question, therefore, is the degree to which tax policy can 
encourage Canadians to save for their future needs. New studies on savings 
behaviour would certainly help shed more light on this question. As Bernheim 
(1999) notes, an important element of tax-deductibility for savings is its 
psychological effect on individuals’ proclivity to contribute to savings plans. 
Yet, little research is undertaken in Canada to understand what impact the tax  
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treatment of registered pension and retirement savings plans has on Canadian 
savings. Reliance on U.S. studies is not helpful for Canadian research. As 
Milligan (2001) notes, Canada’s tax treatment of retirement savings provides 
much more flexibility compared to that in the United States, including greater 
opportunity to carry forward amounts and withdraw amounts for 
contingencies prior to retirement. However, limits for contributing to 
retirement savings plans have not been keeping up with inflation in recent 
years, never mind with growth in wage income. Further, the role of public 
support — Old Age Security and Canada/Quebec Pension Plans — is much 
different than that found in the United States, therefore impacting differently 
on the incentives for Canadians to save for retirement. Further, as Shillington 
(1999) pointed out, income testing of the Guaranteed Income Supplement for 
the elderly, old age security pensions, and certain refundable credits can 
affect the incentive for Canadians to save for retirement. 
 
 
Global Economic Integration 
 
Although integration at the international level has not been a new 
phenomenon — after all, Canada has benefited from trade and factor flows 
throughout its history — the past two decades have witnessed unique growth 
in international linkages. Cross-border financial transactions have developed 
remarkably. Intra-firm trade by multinational companies across national 
boundaries has become increasingly prominent. Inbound and outbound 
investment has sharply increased for many countries. Although not dis-
appearing, borders between countries are “thinning” (Helliwell, 2000). 
The reduction in transportation and communication costs has allowed 
businesses to conduct operations more easily in several countries at a time, 
looking for cost efficiencies and highly skilled labour. To attract businesses 
and jobs, countries have been looking towards improving the quality of skilled 
labour, infrastructure and other factors that improve the business 
environment. Coupled with the demographic changes, as discussed above, 
capital investment is critical for improvements in productivity. 
Seen in this light, the pool of domestic savings plays an important role in 
creating a better environment for economic growth. Increased domestic 
savings can provide new financing and a lower cost of capital for small and 
medium sized Canadian businesses. Canadian ownership of capital can 
provide greater returns to the Canadian economy from investments taking 
place either in Canada or in other countries. Such returns help Canadians 
accumulate wealth for future needs as well. Some recent theories suggest that 
the savings can also reduce income inequality. With additional resources,  
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lower income households can benefit from increased investments in capital, 
including the acquisition of skills and training, and reduced levels of un-
employment.  
Nonetheless, there has been little quantification of the effect that 
domestic saving policies, including tax policy, could have on economic growth 
and income inequality, particularly taking into account increased global 
integration on the Canadian economy.
6  
Further, given the difficulties being encountered at the international level 
to tax income from savings, the administrative and compliance problems of 
levying income taxes are becoming more troublesome. Mintz and Chen 
(2000), for example, suggest that the corporate income tax, as we know it 
today, could wither in the next two decades given the problems involved with 
levying c orporate taxes on income that can be easily shifted from one 




Conclusion: Potential Canadian Tax Reforms 
 
 
Given demographic pressures and increased international economic integra-
tion, the tax treatment of savings becomes a more central policy focus for the 
medium term. Several policies have been proposed, but much more research 
is needed to understand their economic impacts and incidence. Several 
potential policies that are not difficult to achieve include: 
 
·   A sharp increase i n sales tax revenues (sales and excise) to reduce 
reliance on income taxes. 
 
·   A major expansion of RRSP and pension limits to allow for greater 
accumulation of wealth to meet future contingencies of various sorts. 
 
                                                             
6Some theoretical underpinnings are provided in Frenkel and Razin (1994). 
·   The introduction of an exempt-yield tax saving plans (with restrictions on 
contributed amounts) that would encourage saving by individuals 
expecting increases in future tax rates (Kesselman and Poschmann, 
2001). Like owner-occupied housing, contributions to plans would not be 
deductible and withdrawals would not be taxable. Income in the plan 
would not be taxed and borrowed interest would not be deductible. As 
the Meade Report (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1978) suggested, the value  
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of this treatment of savings is to permit individuals to more effectively 
average their consumption base over time. 
 
A more significant reform would be to replace fully the income tax with 
an expenditure tax system, continuing reliance on the other indirect forms of 
consumption taxation (sales taxes). The adoption of a consumption tax would 
certainly set Canada apart from other countries, including the United States. 
However, such a reform would require careful consideration of 
implementation issues, including transition, business level taxation and the 
treatment of international transactions (Bradford, 2000). However, as the 
literature has found in the past, the technical issues are not insurmountable. 
The primary issue is to consider how important future consumption is to 
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